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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Counsel for a class of plaintiffs who were successful in 
their suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 1001-1461, against the 
sponsor of a pension plan who had terminated the plan and 
seized the surplus plan assets sought counsel fees, both 
under the statutory fee shifting provision and from the fund 
recovered on behalf of the class. The employer/plan 
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sponsor agreed to pay the successful plaintiffs $460,000 in 
attorney's fees and expenses, pursuant to ERISA's statutory 
fee provision. The union representing the employees, which 
opposed payment of any additional fee from the 
participants' fund, intervened and objected to any 
additional fees from the fund awarded on behalf of the plan 
participants and beneficiaries. The District Court denied 
counsel's application for recovery of fees from the common 
fund, a position it reaffirmed on reconsideration. Counsel 
appeals. In reviewing the award of counsel fee, this court 
determines whether the District Court abused its 
discretion, see Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 64-65 (3d 
Cir. 1982), although in this case the scope of review will be 
discussed in more detail hereafter. 
 
I. 
 
In 1988 and 1989, counsel initiated two lawsuits on 
behalf of eight individual plaintiffs against plaintiffs' former 
employer Spang & Company ("Spang"), alleging that Spang 
violated ERISA by failing to distribute surplus pension plan 
assets to retired workers and violated the Labor 
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C.S 185, by 
breaching a labor agreement. At the inception of the 
litigation, the individual plaintiffs assigned their right to a 
fee award under ERISA to counsel in exchange for counsel's 
services. Those two lawsuits were later consolidated with a 
similar lawsuit filed by other plaintiffs and all three suits 
ultimately were certified as a class action. 
 
In 1995, the District Court, relying on our prior decision 
in Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(relating to a similar pension fund at a different Spang 
plant), found that Spang had wrongfully acquired the 
surplus assets of an ERISA-protected retirement fund 
instead of distributing the surplus proportionately to the 
retirees as required by the pension plan. The court ordered 
Spang to pay the entire amount of the reversion which 
Spang had taken when the pension plan terminated, plus 
interest since August 31, 1988. As a result, the class 
received approximately $12,500,000. We affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court. See Brytus v. Spang & Co., 
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79 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir.) (unpublished table decision), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 818 (1996). 
 
After the District Court had completed the merits phase, 
the litigating plaintiffs sought reasonable attorney's fees 
under the statutory fee provision of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(g)(1); in the same motion, two of the counsel for the 
plaintiff class,1 Daniel P. McIntyre and William T. Payne 
(referred to herein as "counsel"), "also invoke[d] the 
common fund doctrine as warranting a recovery of fees out 
of the fund they have recovered on behalf of the class." 
App. at 224. Spang did not contest the right of the litigating 
plaintiffs to recover from it reasonable attorney's fees under 
the fee provision of ERISA, objecting only as to the hourly 
rates and costs claimed. The United Steelworkers 
Association (the "Union") intervened to oppose counsel's 
motion for the recovery of fees from the common fund. 
 
In its first Memorandum Order on this issue, dated July 
14, 1997, the District Court distinguished between 
counsel's entitlement to reasonable statutory fees and 
expenses under ERISA and under a common-fund theory. 
It noted the Union's position that because the action was 
litigated to judgment under the fee-shifting provision of 
ERISA, counsel cannot also recover fees under a common 
fund theory. However, the District Court did not make such 
a determination as a matter of law, but held that"under 
the facts and circumstances of this case," counsel were not 
entitled to recover fees pursuant to a common fund theory. 
In re Spang & Co. Litig., Nos. 88-1548, 91-1041, slip op. at 
2 (W.D. Pa. July 14, 1997) (hereafter "July 14 slip op."). 
 
Counsel moved for reconsideration of that order, 
asserting that they had not had an opportunity tofile a 
brief in response to the Union's opposition to a common 
fund fee. Counsel argued that they should be awarded a fee 
of 20 to 30 percent of the then-$11,500,000 dollar common 
fund, or approximately $2,300,000 to $3,450,000. Upon 
reconsideration, the District Court affirmed its earlier order, 
holding that in its discretion a reasonable fee to be paid by 
Spang pursuant to the ERISA fee provision was warranted, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In contrast, the attorney who represented the plaintiffs in the third 
suit did not move for additional fees. 
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but that an additional fee award to be paid from the 
common fund was not. See In re Spang & Co. Litig., Nos. 
88-2548, 91-1041, slip op. at 5-6 (W.D. Pa. August 15, 
1997) (hereafter "August 15 slip op."). 
 
Counsel appealed from that order. However, because the 
District Court had not yet quantified the amount of 
statutory fees, we held the order was not final and 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Brytus v. 
Spang & Co., 151 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1998). Now that the 
statutory fee award has been quantified, we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 over counsel's 
renewed appeal from the final order denying additional fees 
from the common fund. 
 
II. 
 
Under what has been denominated the "American Rule" 
for payment of fees, "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not 
entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the 
loser." Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 
421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Instead, attorneys are paid 
pursuant to contract with their clients. Over the years, a 
widespread exception has grown as an increasing number 
of statutes have authorized payment of attorney's fees by 
one party to the party that prevailed. The ERISA statutory 
fee provision is such a congressional enactment. It provides 
that "the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable 
attorney's fee and costs of action to either party." 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(g)(1). 
 
Pursuant to that statute, the defendant in an ERISA 
action usually bears the burden of attorney's fees for the 
prevailing plaintiff or plaintiff class, thus "encourag[ing] 
private enforcement of the statutory substantive rights, 
whether they be economic or noneconomic, through the 
judicial process." Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 
Court Awarded Attorney Fees 15 (Oct. 8, 1985), reprinted at 
108 F.R.D. 237, 250. Although the statutory fee belongs to 
the litigating party, often, as in this case, plaintiffs will 
assign their right to any statutory fee to their counsel at the 
outset of the litigation, thus making payment of fees to 
counsel contingent on successful litigation and attainment 
of the statutory fee from the losing party. 
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Another well-recognized exception to the general principle 
that an attorney must look to his or her own client for 
payment of attorney's fees is the common fund doctrine. 
Since the decisions in Trustees of the Internal Improvement 
Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1882), 
and Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Ga. v. Pettus, 113 
U.S. 116 (1885), the Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized "that a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a 
common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself 
or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from 
the fund as a whole." Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 
472, 478 (1980). The doctrine reflects the traditional 
practice in equity, and "rests on the perception that 
persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without 
contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the 
successful litigant's expense." Id. Parties as well as counsel 
can seek fees under the common fund doctrine, for the 
doctrine rests on a theory of unjust enrichment on the part 
of beneficiaries of a successful lawsuit at the expense of the 
litigants. See id. 
 
The distinction between the fee in these two types of 
cases, statutory fee and common fund fee, has practical 
relevance. First, it determines who pays the awarded fee. 
Under the common fund doctrine the plaintiff class as a 
whole rather than the defendant bears the burden of 
attorney's fees. Second, it affects how the fee is calculated, 
as the "lodestar" method applied to set a reasonable 
attorney's fee under a statutory fee provision, see Hensley 
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983), is not 
necessarily applied under the common fund doctrine. 
 
The method for establishing the statutory fee is now 
settled by Supreme Court cases. The court must start by 
taking the amount of time reasonably expended by counsel 
for the prevailing party on the litigation, and compensate 
that time at a reasonable hourly rate to arrive at the 
lodestar. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' 
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986) (Delaware 
Valley I). Originally, it was contemplated that the lodestar 
could be adjusted upward or downward depending on a 
variety of factors, see Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Phila. v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 
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161, 167-69 (3d Cir. 1973), but more recently the Supreme 
Court has sharply limited the number of factors which can 
be considered in adjusting the lodestar amount. 
 
Of particular relevance to this appeal, the Supreme Court 
has held that courts may not increase the lodestar amount 
in consideration of the attorney's contingent risk when 
calculating a fee awarded pursuant to statute. See City of 
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992). According to 
the Court, the lodestar amount "is `presumed to be the 
reasonable fee' to which counsel is entitled." Delaware 
Valley I, 478 U.S. at 564 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 
U.S. 886, 897 (1984)) (emphasis in original). "Although 
upward adjustments of the lodestar figure are still 
permissible, such modifications are proper only in certain 
rare and exceptional cases, supported by both specific 
evidence on the record and detailed findings by the lower 
courts." Id. at 565 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 
Attorney's fees under the common fund doctrine may be 
calculated using the lodestar method but more frequently 
such fees have been awarded using the percentage-of- 
recovery method, which awards a fee based on a percentage 
of plaintiffs' recovery. See generally In re Prudential Ins. Co. 
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 333 (3d Cir. 1998), 
cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 890 (1999). The Supreme Court has 
not yet decided whether its decision in Dague precluding 
the use of a multiplier in consideration of risk taken when 
calculating fees under the lodestar method applies in 
common fund cases, but some courts of appeals have held 
it does not. See, e.g., In re Washington Pub. Power Supply 
System Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1299 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Florin v. NationsBank of Ga., N.A., 34 F.3d 560, 564-65 (7th 
Cir. 1994). But see In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck 
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir. 
1995) (stating in dictum that court using lodestar method 
in common fund case could not apply a multiplier for risk 
after Dague). We took cognizance of the issue in In re 
Prudential, assumed "that multipliers for risk or counsel's 
expertise are appropriate in the lodestar cross-check in 
common fund cases," but cautioned that "they require 
particular scrutiny and justification." In re Prudential, 148 
F.3d at 341 n.121. 
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This case presents a hybrid situation. Because ERISA 
provides for a statutory fee, the district court has the 
discretion to require the defendant to pay a reasonable 
attorney's fee calculated under the lodestar method. See 29 
U.S.C. S 1132(g)(1). However, because a common fund was 
created from which all plaintiff members of the class will 
benefit, the court may be able to use the common fund 
doctrine in awarding attorney's fees from that fund, which 
would be deducted from the amount owing to all the 
beneficiaries. As we explain in greater detail below, the fact 
that a common fund has been created does not mean that 
the common fund doctrine must be applied in awarding 
attorney's fees, a suggestion that is implicit in counsel's 
argument. 
 
III. 
 
It is important to note at the outset that counsel do not 
contend that the $460,000 fee paid to them by Spang 
under the ERISA fee-shifting provision was calculated 
contrary to established Supreme Court precedent, and, in 
fact, they stipulated to that amount. They do not argue that 
it provides inadequate recompense for the work performed 
on an hourly basis. We do not understand them to take 
issue with the Union's contention that the statutory fee 
covered every compensable hour spent by counsel, who 
were paid at the rate of $300 per hour for McIntyre and 
$275 per hour for Payne. Rather, they assert that the 
District Court should have awarded a fee from the common 
fund using the percentage-of-recovery method to account 
for the contingent nature of the undertaking and the result 
achieved, and then subtracted from that figure the 
statutory fee award paid by Spang. They argue that in this 
way they would have been satisfactorily paid and yet 
avoided the duplicative recovery that concerned the District 
Court. 
 
Counsel thus stand on the position that since the result 
of the litigation was to create a common pension fund for 
the benefit of all plaintiff class members, they are entitled 
to additional fees based on the common fund doctrine of 
awarding attorney's fees. This presupposes that the Dague 
bar is inapplicable and that counsel in common fund cases 
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are entitled to a multiplier for risk of contingency, an issue 
we need not decide today. 
 
A. 
 
When the appellate courts have referred to the review of 
an award of attorney's fees under the abuse of discretion 
standard, the focus has been on the amount of the 
attorney's fee. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 ("district court 
has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award"). 
However, it is also within the district court's discretion 
whether to award attorney's fees under an equitable 
doctrine such as the common fund doctrine. See Sprague v. 
Taconic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939) 
(recognizing the federal court's power in equity to award 
costs and fees in its discretion from a common fund); see 
also Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125, 146 (3d Cir. 
1999) (noting that "the District Court's discretion in 
deciding whether to grant attorney's fees in an equity case 
is exceedingly broad"). 
 
Counsel argue that we should review the District Court's 
decision in this case de novo because the decision rested on 
a determination of law. We agree that whether the District 
Court applied the proper standard in making its 
discretionary determination is a question of law subject to 
plenary review. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group of 
N.J. v. AT & T Bell Lab., 842 F.2d 1436, 1442 (3d Cir. 
1988). Once we determine there was no legal error, we 
review for abuse of discretion. 
 
Counsel argue that the District Court proceeded on the 
legal misunderstanding that ERISA precludes a common 
fund fee award because it contains a statutory fee 
provision. We do not read the District Court decision to so 
hold. Nor does the Union argue here that the ERISA fee 
provision preempts use of the common fund doctrine in all 
cases. 
 
It is true that in its first opinion the District Court 
included some statements that could be interpreted as a 
categorical rejection of a common fund award to counsel 
who recovered fees under a statutory fee-shifting provision. 
See, e.g., July 14 slip op. at 6 ("The Court also concludes 
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that in seeking an award of counsel fees in an ERISA action 
litigated to judgment and subject to a fee-shifting provision, 
counsel may not recover fees under both the statute and 
against the common fund."). However, in the next sentence 
the court explained that its disapproval was directed to 
duplicative fees. See id. ("To permit counsel to recover fees 
under both a fee-shifting provision and against the common 
fund is to award counsel duplicative recovery, a goal not 
contemplated by either the fee-shifting provision or the 
common fund theory."). The court did explain that the 
underlying rationales of the two approaches were 
inconsistent. But, as previously noted, the court limited its 
holding to "the facts and circumstances of this case." Id. at 
2. 
 
Even more significant, counsel had the opportunity to 
argue their position and entitlement to the common fund 
award to the court when the District Court agreed to 
reconsider its ruling. In particular, they directed the 
District Court to three unreported cases in which district 
courts awarded both statutory and common fund fees. The 
District Court noted that in those cases, where the common 
fund was derived from a settlement, the "courts were 
engaged foremost with awarding reasonable fees rather 
than with establishing a rule of law concerning the recovery 
of both statutory and common fund fees." August 15 slip 
op. at 3-4. The District Court here rejected counsel's 
suggestion that it was obliged to award common fund fees 
in a fee-shifting action whenever a fund is created that 
benefits non-plaintiffs, but made explicit that it was not 
establishing a categorical rule. It stated: "Without 
addressing the question of whether a fee-shifting statute 
does or does not preempt the application of the common fund 
doctrine, the Court finds that Counsels' argument [that they 
were entitled to recover both statutory and common fund 
fees] is logically flawed." Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The 
court continued: "[m]erely because a statute does not 
preempt the application of a doctrine, it does not follow that 
a court is required to apply the doctrine." Id. (emphasis in 
original). The court reiterated its understanding"that a 
district court's duty in awarding attorneys fees is to 
determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees to be 
awarded in each case," id. at 3 (emphasis in original), and 
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explained "it is precisely because the common fund doctrine 
is an equitable doctrine that its application rests within the 
discretion of the district court," id. at 4. 
 
This discussion in the District Court's opinion on 
reconsideration should lay to rest any suggestion in the 
court's initial opinion that it believed it was unable to 
award the requested fee should it have wanted to. Indeed, 
at the end of that opinion, the court explained that it 
denied counsel a common fund fee because it believed 
counsel had already been reasonably compensated, 
"[c]onsidering the fact that the result in this case is 
principally driven by ERISA, the Court, in the exercise of its 
equitable powers, finds that under the totality of the 
circumstances, an award of reasonable attorneys' fees 
based on an unenhanced lodestar formula plus expenses is 
the only reasonable method of compensating . . . counsel 
for their services." Id. at 5-6. Thus, as was the case for the 
Court in its review of the fee in Pettus more than one 
hundred years ago, the touchstone for the District Court's 
determination of the amount of the fee award was its 
reasonableness. We therefore review the District Court's 
determination of reasonableness as well as its decision that 
no additional fees were warranted from the common fund 
for abuse of discretion. 
 
B. 
 
In considering whether the District Court abused its 
discretion, we consider primarily whether the 
circumstances of this case present an inequity that needs 
redress, which is the typical situation for application of the 
common fund doctrine. As the Supreme Court has 
explained, the common fund doctrine "rests on the 
perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit 
without contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the 
successful litigant's expense." Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478. For 
example, in Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. 
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882), the first Supreme Court 
case to recognize the common fund doctrine, the Court held 
an individual plaintiff was entitled to an attorney's fee from 
the common fund as he had paid counsel over the course 
of the litigation. The Court found that it would be unjust if 
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that plaintiff were required to bear the entire cost of the 
litigation with no contribution from the other beneficiaries 
of the fund. See id. at 532. 
 
Unjust enrichment was also the basis for upholding an 
award of attorney's fees in Boeing to be paid from an 
unclaimed common fund to compensate the individual 
class action claimants for their legal expenses. See 444 U.S. 
at 480. The litigating plaintiffs had brought a class action 
against Boeing for its failure to provide adequate notice of 
the class members' rights to convert the company's 
debentures into stock. As damages, plaintiffs were each 
awarded the difference between the redemption price of the 
outstanding debentures and the price at which the shares 
of Boeing's stock traded on the last day for exercising 
conversion rights. A common fund was created for the 
unclaimed portion of the judgment from which non- 
litigating class members could assert claims, with the 
remainder to return to Boeing. The award of attorney's fees 
from the unclaimed portion of the judgment was upheld on 
the ground that absentee class members had received a 
benefit within the meaning of the common fund doctrine. 
As the Supreme Court explained, "Unless absentees 
contribute to the payment of attorney's fees incurred on 
their behalves, they will pay nothing for the creation of the 
fund and their representatives may bear additional costs." 
Id. at 480. Thus, the Court continued, an award from the 
common fund "rectifies this inequity by requiring every 
member of the class to share attorneys' fees to the same 
extent that he can share the recovery." Id. 
 
In this case, there is no inequity to redress, as Spang 
ultimately bore the entire cost of the litigation. Counsel 
argue that their clients, the original plaintiffs, assigned to 
counsel any statutory fee they received, but in fact those 
plaintiffs paid nothing toward counsel's fee, as that was 
received from Spang. The class members may have been 
enriched, but their enrichment was not at the expense of 
either the litigating parties or their counsel. 
 
Nor in this case can counsel argue they did not receive a 
reasonable fee. This is unlike the situation in Central 
Railroad & Banking Co. of Georgia v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 
(1885), where, in approving an attorney's fee award from 
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the common fund created by counsel on behalf of all 
unsecured creditors of the debtor, the Court noted both 
that the non-litigating creditors would have benefitted 
without contributing toward compensation for counsel for 
services performed, see id. at 126-27, and that the amount 
of fees counsel had received from their clients was not a 
"reasonable" fee in that case. See id. at 127. Here, the 
District Court found that the fee was reasonable, and we 
have no reason to disagree.2 
 
Of the many additional arguments counsel raise, the one 
that we believe requires some discussion is their contention 
that the District Court penalized them for proceeding to 
judgment, which resulted in the award of a statutory fee, 
whereas they would have been entitled to a fee under the 
common fund doctrine had they accepted a settlement. 
Counsel argue that, as a result, lawyers' self-interest might 
lead them to accept an otherwise inadequate settlement 
rather than rely on the vagaries of a court-awarded counsel 
fee. This, of course, is not a case that was concluded by 
settlement. This case was tried to judgment, and a fee 
awarded on that basis. We are not inclined to base our 
ruling on some hypothetical situation that might be 
presented in the future. 
 
It is true that some courts have awarded a percentage fee 
under the common fund doctrine from class action 
settlements in which a statutory provision would have 
applied had the case gone to judgment. See, e.g., Florin, 34 
F.3d at 563; Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 
255 (7th Cir. 1988). This court also has approved an award 
of fees from the common fund when the case has settled. 
See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 583 (3d 
Cir. 1984) ("settlements releasing defendants from both 
damage and statutory fee liability . . . result in a fund in 
court from which fees [can] be awarded under the equitable 
fund doctrine"). When there has been a settlement, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Counsel argue that the District Court's decision failed to reflect that 
they had evoked the LMRA in the complaint. The District Court 
acknowledged that an LMRA claim was included, but treated this case as 
principally driven by ERISA. There was no additional recovery on the 
basis of the LMRA. 
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basis for the statutory fee has been discharged, and it is 
only the fund that remains. It is possible to negotiate a fee 
from the defendant in the context of a settlement although 
this must be carefully monitored to avoid conflicts of 
interest. See In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 334-35. In any 
event, consideration of the attorney's fees was likely 
factored into the amount of settlement. 
 
Of course, there remains the possibility that in some 
cases counsel for a class of plaintiffs may receive a higher 
fee award upon settlement than they would have received 
had the case proceeded to judgment. We have directed the 
district courts to subject all fee applications in class action 
settlements to "thorough judicial review." See In re General 
Motors, 55 F.3d at 819. The disparity between fees resulting 
from application of the different methods of calculation will 
be minimized if the district courts cross-check the fee from 
the percentage of recovery method against that from the 
lodestar method to assure that the percentage awarded 
does not create an unreasonable hourly fee. Id. at 822; In 
re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 341, n.121. The Union has 
suggested that the percentage fee counsel asks from the 
common fund would give them a fee of $1,000 per hour. We 
have no occasion to check that figure. The ultimate goal in 
these cases is the award of a "reasonable" fee to 
compensate counsel for their efforts, irrespective of the 
method of calculation. 
 
Further, the distinction between the statutory fee and the 
fee from a common fund is more than the amount of the 
fee; it is the party who pays the fee. The District Court 
stressed this fact and made explicit its concern that an 
award of fees from the common fund would deprive the 
beneficiaries of a portion of the award, whereas it was 
defendant Spang who was responsible for the statutory fee. 
Counsel suggest that nothing in ERISA insulates fund 
participants from litigation costs, and note that there have 
been ERISA cases which applied the common fund 
doctrine. Counsel concede, however, that by far the largest 
number of ERISA cases to apply the common fund analysis 
are those that were settled, which, as we have noted, 
present a different circumstance. 
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This is not to say that the common fund doctrine may 
never be applied in a case for which there is a statutory fee 
provision and which goes to judgment. One such instance 
could be when the defendant responsible for the statutory 
fee has become bankrupt or otherwise has insufficient 
funds. Another is when there has been a showing that 
competent counsel could not have been obtained for that 
case or that line of cases. No such showing has been 
attempted here. We see no reason to list all the other 
possible situations. For the purposes of this case, it is 
enough to hold that the District Court here did not abuse 
its discretion in declining to award additional fees to be 
taken from the ERISA recovery under the common fund 
doctrine.3 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District 
Court's order awarding statutory attorney's fees pursuant 
to 29 U.S.C. S 1132(g)(1) and denying additional fees out of 
the common fund. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In arguing that the District Court gave only one reason for its 
decision 
 
not to award common fund fees in this case, the dissent overlooks the 
District Court's statements that counsel had already been compensated 
by the defendant Spang when the case went to judgment and that 
counsel had received a reasonable fee from that source. The dissent does 
not dispute either reason. Instead, the entire dissent is directed to 
countering the suggestion that the District Court would "never award [ ] 
common fund fees in an ERISA case that goes to judgment," a statement 
the District Court did not make and that we, in any event, have 
expressly rejected. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and 
remand the case for further proceedings. While the District 
Court's August 15th opinion can be read as an exercise of 
discretion, it does not adequately explain its decision to 
deny common fund fees in this case. The only reason the 
District Court offered for its decision to deny such fees was 
that "the Court remains concerned with awarding 
reasonable fees in light of the fee-shifting statute." August 
15 slip op. at 4-5. In my view, that single sentence, which 
is essentially a reason for never awarding common fund 
fees in an ERISA case that goes to judgment, does not 
sufficiently explain why in this case such fees are 
inappropriate. Without such an explanation, we are 
effectively unable to review the District Court's decision. 
 
Although today's decision leaves open the possibility that 
common fund fee awards could be made in future ERISA 
cases that proceed to judgment, such fees will only be 
available in cases where either the defendant is unable to 
pay the statutory fee or plaintiffs' counsel can successfully 
show "that competent counsel could not have been 
obtained for that case or that line of cases." Slip op. at 15. 
On the other hand, my colleagues freely concede, as they 
must, that common fund fee awards are routinely given in 
settled cases in which a statutory-fee provision would have 
applied had the case gone to judgment. They further 
concede that "there remains a possibility that in some cases 
counsel for a class of plaintiffs may receive a higher fee 
award upon settlement than they would have received had 
the case proceeded to judgment." Slip op. at 14. I find that 
unacceptable. While my colleagues are content to have one 
set of principles apply to settlements and another to 
judgments, I would follow the course this Court charted in 
In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products 
Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (hereinafter 
"General Motors"), and apply the same legal principles to 
both those cases that go to judgment and those that settle. 
 
In General Motors, we reviewed a counsel-fee award in 
the context of a settled case. The relevant analysis, 
however, is equally applicable to fee awards following a 
judgment. We recognized that each of the two principal 
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methods of awarding fees -- percentage of recovery ("POR") 
and lodestar -- "has distinct advantages for certain kinds of 
actions, which will make one of the methods more 
appropriate as a primary basis for determining the fee." 55 
F.3d at 820. It is, therefore, important for "a court making 
or approving a fee award [to] determine what sort of action 
the court is adjudicating and then primarily rely on the 
corresponding method of awarding fees . . . ." Id. at 821. 
The Court in General Motors recognized that there are 
essentially two types of cases -- "statutory fee cases" and 
"common fund cases." The lodestar method is generally 
more appropriate for the former, while the POR method is 
more appropriate for the latter. In "hybrid" cases which 
share the attributes of both a statutory fee case and a 
common fund case, it is within the district court's 
discretion to make a particularized determination as to 
whether the case "more closely resembles" a common fund 
case or a statutory fee case. General Motors, 55 F.3d at 
822; see also McLendon v. The Continental Group Inc., 872 
F. Supp. 142, 151 (D.N.J. 1994) (recognizing the 
discretionary nature of the decision). I believe that the 
District Court should be required to make such a 
determination in this case. 
 
I am concerned about the practical implications of the 
Court's opinion. Now that risk multipliers can no longer be 
used in calculating fees by the lodestar method, use of the 
POR method often results in significantly higher fee awards. 
See, e.g., In re Computron Software, Inc., 6 F. Supp.2d 313, 
323 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that fee award of approximately 
2.5 times the lodestar amount was fair); Local 56, United 
Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Campbell Soup Co., 
954 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 n.7 (D.N.J. 1997) ("[a]lthough the 
court recognizes that $3,239,373 is more than two times 
the lodestar, the court nevertheless finds such an award 
fair and reasonable under the circumstances"); J/H Real 
Estate Inc. v. Abramson, 951 F. Supp. 63, 65 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (finding that fee award more than 2.5 times the 
lodestar is "generous but fair premium"); In re Residential 
Doors Antitrust Litigation, No. 94-3744, Civ. A. 96-2125, 
MDL 1039, 1998 WL 151804, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 1998) 
(finding that a fee 1.7 times the lodestar amount was a 
reasonable fee). Under today's ruling, there will be a 
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significant number of cases in which plaintiffs' counsel will 
be in a position to secure a POR award if there is a 
settlement, but will be limited to a substantially smaller, 
lodestar award if the case goes to trial. This creates a 
compelling incentive for the plaintiffs' counsel to settle, 
thus adding to the already significant conflict of interest 
between plaintiff class members and their counsel. See 
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's 
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private 
Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 
86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986). For this reason, the method 
of awarding attorneys' fees should not turn on the manner 
in which the case is resolved. 
 
If the District Court had determined that this case more 
closely resembled a common fund case1 and had granted 
the fee award here sought, its decision would not, in my 
judgment, conflict in any way with ERISA's fee-shifting 
provision. The defendant would wind up paying no more 
and no less than it would pay if the award had been made 
under the fee-shifting statute, 29 U.S.C. S 1132(g)(1). And 
the plaintiffs' counsel would not receive any duplicative 
recovery; the amount received from the defendant would be 
deducted from the common fund award. 
 
This leaves the union's argument that S 1132(g)(1) reflects 
a general Congressional intent that a lodestar-calculated fee 
from the opposing party would be the exclusive method for 
court-ordered compensation of counsel in ERISA cases. I 
fail to perceive any evidence of such an intention, much 
less sufficient evidence to overcome the prescription against 
construing legislation to abrogate the courts' traditional, 
inherent authority. 
 
The Supreme Court has expressly held that it is within 
the "inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys' fees in 
particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress . . . ." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This is not a case in which a class of plan participants seek to 
recover 
 
the benefits to which they are individually entitled. Rather, it is a suit 
seeking to compel the restoration of trust funds wrongfully diverted. The 
recovery is to be paid to the trust for the benefit of all participants. 
This 
suit, therefore, has much in common with the breach of fiduciary duty 
cases in which the common fund doctrine has traditionally been applied. 
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Alyeska Pipeline Services Co. v. Wilderness Society , 421 
U.S. 240, 259 (1975) (emphasis added). It has similarly 
held that there is a strong presumption against the 
abrogation of courts' traditional equity powers. See 
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (while the 
inherent powers of the lower federal courts may be limited 
by statute, as they were created by an act of Congress, "we 
do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart 
from established principles such as the scope of a court's 
inherent power") (internal quotation omitted); see 
also County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 
1295, 1327 (2d Cir. 1990) ("fee-shifting statutes are 
generally not intended to circumscribe the operation of the 
equitable fund doctrine"). 
 
Nothing in ERISA forbids courts from awarding common 
fund fees in appropriate cases. Quite the contrary, to the 
extent any general Congressional intent with respect to fee 
awards can be gleaned from ERISA, it is to preserve the 
courts' traditional equity powers. The statute specifically 
authorizes courts to grant "appropriate equitable relief," Id. 
S 1132(a)(3), and its savings clause provides that it shall 
not "be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate or 
supersede any law of the United States." 29 U.S.C. 
S 1144(d). 
 
In conclusion, if the District Court had made a 
particularized determination that this case more closely 
resembled a common fund case than a statutory fee case, 
it would have had the power to award common fund fees, 
notwithstanding ERISA's fee-shifting provision. Because the 
District Court made no such determination, however, I 
believe the case must be remanded for further proceedings. 
I respectfully dissent. 
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